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SUFFERING FOR REDEMPTION:
A REPLY TO SMITH
Eleonore Stump
In his comments on my paper "The Problem of Evil" Michael Smith raises
some objections to my understanding of omnipotence and free will, a worry
about my interpretation of the after-life and the Fall, and a moral concern about
the character of God as presented in my paper. In the short space allotted me
for a reply, I will briefly touch on his objections in the order given, which I
take to be in order of increasing importance.
In my paper I argued that a person's freely willing that God fix his will enables
God to alter that person's will without violating its freedom. Smith objects that
I have confused freedom of a process with freedom of the product and that the
freedom of a will is "determined by the nature of that will and not how this
nature has come about." Now while I agree with Smith that there is a difference
between a process and a product, and between the freedom of one and that of
the other, I do not see that I have confused the two or that Smith has presented
them appropriately in the examples he gives to support his objection. Consider
these examples of Smith's: (1) a person who is free freely sells herself into
slavery, and (2) a person who is a slave is freed against her will. These, I take
it, are supposed to be examples in which (respectively) a free process results in
an unfree product and an unfree process results in a free product, but it seems
to me that the force of these examples is generated by an ambiguous use of
'free' and by a confusion about what freedom is being attributed to.
The second case concerns a person whose acts are not free, in the sense that
they are legally and practically coerced by someone else; but nothing in this
state of affairs shows that the slave's will is not free, even just in the minimal
sense of not being causally determined by someone else. On the contrary, the
point of the example is that the slave wills to remain a slave; and unless some
longer story is told, the slave's willing to remain a slave is an act of free will.
This act of will does not bring about the state of affairs willed because the slave
in virtue of being a slave is coerced into acting in accordance with her master's
will. But it is her status which is coerced and not her will; otherwise, the act of
freeing her could not be against her will. So in this example of Smith's we do
not have a case in which an unfree process results in a free product, if what we
mean by this description of the case is that an act of free will produces a state
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of will which is not free, which are the process and product at issue in my paper.
On the other hand, if what we mean is that by a process which involves coercing
someone's actions that person can be brought into a state in which her actions
are more under her own control than they were previously, the example is no
longer relevant to my argument, which concerned only an act of free will and
the state of will it produces.
Something similar can be said about Smith's first example. The free woman
who sells herself into slavery is a person who freely wills (for whatever reason)
to enter a state of slavery. Having entered that state, she will find her actions
legally and practically coerced; but her will is not any less free. It is still open
to her, for example, to will not to be a slave. If she does so will, she may find
herself in danger, or she may even lose her life; but she can unquestionably still
so will. So this is a case in which an act of will that is not causally determined
by someone else results in a state in which the actions of the one willing are
legally and practically coerced by someone else; but it is not a case in which an
act of free will results in a state of will which is not free, where by 'free' in
both cases we mean at least 'not causally determined by someone else.' Hence,
this example is not relevant to my argument either.
As for Smith's general claim that only the nature of the state of will and not
the process resulting in that state determines whether the will is free, I think the
examples given in my paper show that this claim is not true. If Augustine had
continued to will incontinence and if God had then caused him to have a continent
state of will, Augustine's continent state of will would not have been free. It
would have been a state of will brought about solely by God and in opposition
to what Augustine "himself willed. On the other hand, if Augustine wills that
God produce in him a continent state of will, then that state is brought about
partly by Augustine and in accordance with what he wills. Therefore, in the
only sort of case at issue in my paper the freedom of the "process" is crucially
relevant to the freedom of the "product."
In addition, Smith disputes my claim that God cannot make a person freely
will anything by pointing out that God can bring about free actions in many
ways, since he can "reason and persuade, exhort and ridicule, beg and bribe."
But Smith has just misunderstood my claim. I was concerned to rule out only
the possibility that God in his omnipotence might directly compel an act of free
will. It is no part of my solution to deny that God can influence persons to
certain acts of free will or that he can contribute to bringing about acts of free
will by offering persuasion, reward, and punishment. On the contrary, my solution
depends on claiming that God uses evil in a complicated process designed to
result in a certain act of free will (namely, freely willing that God fix one's will)
and that God thus contributes to bringing about (but does not causally determine)
an act of free will.
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As for Smith's worry that my solution places undue emphasis on an after-life,
reminiscent of the views of the hasty martyrs of the early Church, I agree that
my solution emphasizes the importance of an after-life, but I deny that the
emphasis is undue. In my paper I am concerned to give a coherent and consistent
picture of Christian beliefs, and on Christian beliefs heaven is an unending state
of unsurpassable bliss. Given this understanding of heaven, it is reasonable that
Christianity should emphasize the importance of the after-life in comparison to
this life. Only an infinitesimal portion of a person's life is lived in this world,
and the best states of that tiny portion are incomparably less good than any state
of life in heaven.
Part of Smith's worry about my emphasis on the after-life is a result, I think,
of his misunderstanding my position on hell. He takes me to be promoting a
very mild doctrine of hell, which, he says, is not well-suited to the rest of what
I claim about the importance of the after-life. My interpretation of hell, however,
is mild only in the sense that it does not include retributive punishment. The
morality of retributive punishment is by itself controversial, and perpetual retributive punishment poses even thornier problems. So for the sake of brevity I
presented an interpretation of hell which does not include God's retributive
punishment but which is nonetheless compatible with the notion of such punishment; and I left it an open question whether God's imposing retributive punishment in hell is justifiable and so properly included in the doctrine of hell. Nothing
in this restriction on the interpretation of hell warrants the conclusion Smith
seems to draw, that on my view the pains of hell are mild. On my interpretation,
the pains of hell are spiritual or psychological; but it is perfectly possible for
psychological pain to be at least as dreadful as physical pain. Think of the pain
of the unmitigated loneliness which sometimes accompanies old age or of the
pain of being permanently rejected by the person one loves passionately; or,
most aptly, think of the pain of mental illness, which is often described by its
sufferers in lucid moments as worse than any physical pain. It is true that on
my solution to the problem of evil, life as a human being is preferable to
annihilation or loss of human nature. What this ranking shows, however, is not
that on my exposition of Christian doctrine the pains of hell are mild, but rather
that on Christian doctrine the value of a human life is very great.
Smith also raises a worry over my interpretation of the Fall, claiming that it
implausibly takes the Fall to be a single datable event and that it espouses a
Lamarckian view of genetics. But a careful reading of my interpretation, spelled
out as (8'a), (8'b), and (8'c), will show that it does not entail anything regarding
the dating of the events which resulted in the Fall except that they are in the
past. The claim that the Fall was brought about by a single datable event is
compatible with (8'); but so is the claim that the Fall was the product of many
human actions taking place over a very long period of time. As for the charge
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of Lamarckianism, although Lamarckianism includes the belief that acquired
traits are inheritable, not just any view that a self-produced alteration in a creature
is inheritable is Lamarckianism. The claim that it is possible for a human being
to alter his nature, even in a single datable event, in such a way that the alteration
is transmissible to offspring is neither controversial nor Lamarckian. Consider,
for example, a man who is exposed to radiation of such a sort that he contracts
cancer and his genu cells are altered in a way which makes it virtually certain
that his posterity will develop cancer. One need not be a Lamarckian to suppose
that cases of such a sort occur. And similarly I see nothing Lamarckian about
supposing that the changes in human nature brought about in the process resulting
in the Fall were in some way accompanied by inheritable changes in the human
genome.
Finally, and I think most importantly, Smith raises a moral concern over my
solution. There is a limit, he say, to what decent people will accept as a means
to an end; and the claim that all the evils in the world are instrumental goods is
morally reprehensible. If God is using evil as a means to good, Smith maintains,
he is in the same moral position as a man who tortures a child to save the world:
we would not love such a person but be repelled by him. There are two things
wrong with this objection.
In the first place, what strikes us as repellent about the torturer, I think, is
that he is willing to accept the involuntary pain of a child as a means to a good
which benefits the child only incidentally or indirectly. His intention in hurting
the child is to purchase a good for the species, and he finds the child's suffering
acceptable as the purchase price of that good. But my account emphasizes the
importance of tying the benefit won by the suffering to the person suffering.
What I argue is that there is something morally repulsive about supposing that
the point of allowing a child to suffer is some abstract benefit for the race as a
whole and, therefore, that the good which justifies a child's pain must be a
benefit/or that child. And it is clear that we do not find reprehensible a person
who inflicts pain on a child when the point of doing so is solely and primarily
to provide a benefit for the child which outweighs the pain. We approve of and
commiserate with, we do not censure, a parent who puts a child with muscular
dystrophy to dreadful pain to prevent her death, even though we know that the
child's life will thereby be prolonged only a few years at best. We regard those
few years of life as a great good, worth the pain of surgery and therapy. On my
solution God is analogous not to Smith's torturer but to a long-suffering parent
with sick children.
But there is another, much more important disanalogy between God and the
man who tortures a child to save the world. The torturer is the sale cause of the
child's suffering. The evils from which the torturer is saving the world are the
reason for the torturer's hurting the child; but these evils by themselves without
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the torturer would not have produced the child's pain. Without God, however,
the inmates of Auschwitz would have suffered just the same (assuming for the
moment that it is possible to conceive of the world's existing without God's
existing). God did not initiate the evils of Auschwitz or cause the pain of the
inmates; the Nazis did. But it is arguable that God uses the evils caused by
others for the sake of bringing about a good which is the best available in the
circumstances and which outweighs the suffering. In my discussion of the story
of Cain and Abel, I argued that if God had intervened to prevent Abel's death,
both Cain and Abel would have been worse off and that God therefore refrains
from intervening. That God does not intervene does not mean God directly wills
Abel's death, as the torturer wills the child's suffering. On the contrary, God's
will, considered unconditionally, must be that Cain not murder his brother;
otherwise God's anger and punishment after the murder make no sense. But, as
I argued in my paper, since Cain does not will what he ought to will, God does
not prevent Abel's suffering because this state of affairs is the best obtainable
even by God in the circumstances. As regards moral evil, then, God is not in
the position of the torturer, deciding to cause pain for the sake of some good,
so much as he is analogous to a victim of moral blackmail, deciding not to
prevent pain caused by others because the best state he can bring about in the
dilemma in which he has been put includes that pain-4:>nly on my solution God
is unlike victims of moral blackmail in that (among other things) he can use the
suffering of the victims as a possible contributing means to a greater good for
the victims themselves.
Secondly, as for the more general claim that there is a limit to what decent
people will accept as a means, that there is no good which could justify Auschwitz,
this is a complaint which, if acceptable, is effective not just against my solution
but also against any attempt to reconcile the existence of evil with the existence
of God by claiming that there is a morally sufficient reason for God to allow
evil. This complaint, then, is in effect a challenge to give up one's faith in an
omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God in the face of the horrors of
Auschwitz. I feel the force of this view. Nazi atrocities against the Jews were
so great an evil that there is something disgusting and reprehensible about unemotional discussions of the goods which might constitute a morally sufficient reason
for God to have allowed it. And since we are all members of the species which
perpetrated that evil, since we are in some sense siblings of the evildoers, perhaps
the only seemly response is one like Job's (cf. Job 40:4-5 and 42:2-3): silence
in the face of something beyond our capacities to understand, in recognition of
our unworthiness to judge.
But such a response is a far cry from claiming that there could not be a morally
sufficient reason for God to allow the evils of the Nazis, that there could not be
a good towards which God's allowing Auschwitz is any sort of contributing
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means. Certainly some of the suffering current medical practice inflicts on certain
patients in hospitals is immense, and yet the good which outweighs this medicallyinduced suffering is just the procuring of a few more years of life, often with
diminished capacities and chronic pain. But if we are willing to believe that the
limited good of prolonging a diminished life a little justifies the enormous suffering of the patient, I see no reason for thinking that there could not also be a
good so great as to outweigh the far worse sufferings of the concentration camps.
It is arguable that the precise nature of such a good is beyond our present
capacities to understand. Since the evil of the death camps involves grossly evil
actions on the part of several different nations and the sufferings of millions of
people over a period of years, any outweighing good is likely to be as complicated
as it is great; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that so complicated and great
a good exceeds the limits of our present abilities to comprehend. But reason can
show us, I think, that whatever the exact character of such a good, it must be
of the general sort my solution suggests. It clearly cannot be a bodily good
enjoyed in this life, because as far as we know no people have experienced a
bodily good of such a magnitude. Therefore, if such a good exists, it must
ultimately be a spiritual good experienced in an afterlife. I have no suggestion
for what the direct or immediate good justifying God's allowing Auschwitz might
be. I do not know how to construct for Auschwitz the sort of analysis I constructed
for the story of Cain and Abel, showing that of the options Cain left God, God's
failure to rescue Abel was the best available; and for the reasons sketched in the
preceding paragraph I do not even want to try. But as I argued at length in my
paper, on Christian doctrine the ultimate good which justifies God's permitting
evil and which is open to everyone is salvation from sin and union with God,
and the suffering is for redemption.

